Book Review: Cases Lost, Causes Won: The Supreme Court and the Judicial Process. by Alice Fleetwood Bartee; the Law and Politics of Civil Rights and Liberties. by Richard Morgan; Freedom of Speech in the United States. by Thomas L. Tedford. by Moeller, John
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1986
Book Review: Cases Lost, Causes Won: The
Supreme Court and the Judicial Process. by Alice
Fleetwood Bartee; the Law and Politics of Civil
Rights and Liberties. by Richard Morgan; Freedom
of Speech in the United States. by Thomas L.
Tedford.
John Moeller
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moeller, John, "Book Review: Cases Lost, Causes Won: The Supreme Court and the Judicial Process. by Alice Fleetwood Bartee; the
Law and Politics of Civil Rights and Liberties. by Richard Morgan; Freedom of Speech in the United States. by Thomas L. Tedford."
(1986). Constitutional Commentary. 498.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/498
600 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:588 
[P]hilosophical hermeneutics may try to clarify these debates about 
method, but it should not expect to lead to a total change in the 
empirical practices of the discipline."24 Philosophical hermeneutics 
may be of some value to those disciplines like constitutional theory 
whose thinking about interpretation is somewhat muddled. The 
value of philosophical hermeneutics is in its ability to root out in-
consistencies and expose the lacunae in prevailing theories of consti-
tutional interpretation. Beyond that a constitutional hermeneutics 
has little to offer constitutional lawyers. To suppose that contempo-
rary philosophy might offer us an "exit from the bind" we presently 
find ourselves in, a bind which is in important respects politically 
and historically determined, is to make both a political and a philo-
sophical mistake. 
CASES LOST, CAUSES WON: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. By Alice Fleetwood 
Bartee. 1 New York: St. Martin's Press. 1984. Pp. xiii, 207. 
Paper, $10.95. 
THE LAW AND POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES. By Richard Morgan.I New York: Random 
House. 1985. Pp. 600. $22.00. 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES. By 
Thomas L. Tedford.! New York: Random House. 1985. Pp. 
xvii, 473. $29.95. 
John Moel/er2 
Most of us who teach constitutional law to undergraduates-
whether at state universities or private liberal arts colleges-regard 
24. Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Prespectives, 58 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 135, 137 (1985). 
I. Professor of Political Science, Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield. 
I. Professor of Government, Bowdoin College. 
I. Professor of Communication and Theater, University of North Carolina, 
Greensboro. 
2. Associate Professor of Government, Luther College. 
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it as the most thoroughly enjoyable course in the curriculum. I am 
serious when I tell my students on the first day of class that it is the 
Cadillac of the liberal arts: it touches the entirety of American life 
(from the vilest crook to the highest elected official); it is a compre-
hensive history of American ideas (from the transitory economic 
theories of a particular age to the permanent fundamental principles 
of a free people); it exudes politics (from the appointment of Justices 
to the decisions they render); it is totally human (from the contes-
tants to the Justices); it is fascinating and fun (from reading a single 
opinion to synthesizing a line of cases). 
Unfortunately, for the same reasons, a teacher can easily gener-
ate excitement and enthusiasm without carefully thinking about the 
direction and nature of the course. Pose Griswold and Roe v. Wade 
with a few snide remarks or tell the story of Willie Francis, embel-
lishing the details and stirring the imagination, and the result prob-
ably will be animated students shouting at each other. Because we 
all feel good when our students are participating actively, the barely 
planned, undirected debate is seductive. I am not sure, though, that 
it is good teaching. 
At the same time constitutional law has so many facets that 
one hardly knows where to begin. Some history seems mandatory, 
but how much? Should one rely on broad generalities or emphasize 
the details of particular cases? And where does one draw the line 
between a technical understanding of law and a theoretical under-
standing of the Constitution? Is it more important to dwell on the 
ramifications of standing in a series of cases or to propose broad 
theories that may borrow more from political theory than from case 
law? 
If one regards a constitutional law class as part of that ongoing 
seminar directed by the Supreme Court, then Court opinions are the 
text and one must decide how to treat them. Does one take the 
words seriously or emphasize the personalities behind the words? 
Does one teach that Supreme Court Justices, feeling the mystery 
and continuity of a grand institution, deliberate philosophically in 
search of right answers, or should students learn that because the 
Supreme Court is like all other political institutions it is important 
to discern underlying attitudes and ideological voting blocs? Do we 
want students to regard the Constitution as the fundamental rule of 
law or to approach it as a statement of the nation's most glorious 
aspirations? 
Prior to answering those questions, one must first identify the 
student. One teacher may recruit pre-law students with the promise 
that briefing cases and participating in class will provide a taste of 
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law school, while another teacher encourages English and biology 
majors to take the course because its many components can enrich 
their college experience. It also matters whether this class is likely 
to be the students' primary exposure to ideas about the rule of law 
in general and constitutional law in particular. 
I cannot speak for professors in the law schools, but I do know 
that many teachers of constitutional law in the colleges and univer-
sities struggle with these questions. Because the choice of texts var-
ies according to one's personal preferences, quality of students, and 
class format, I hesitate to evaluate how successfully these particular 
books resolve those questions. Each is designed as an undergradu-
ate text and each carries out its intentions fairly well. Nevertheless, 
these texts presume three distinct approaches to constitutional law, 
and that is what I intend to compare and evaluate in this review. I 
do not want to foist my personal preferences on others, but I hope 
that by suggesting some strengths and weaknesses of each book, I 
can contribute to the dialogue about teaching constitutional law-in 
this case in the colleges-that already has begun in the pages of 
Constitutional Commentary. 
I 
Richard Morgan's The Law and Politics of Civil Rights and 
Liberties represents the doctrinal, case approach to constitutional 
law. Each of the book's five parts-speech, religion, rights of ac-
cused, equality, and privacy-is divided into chapters on specific 
legal problems (subversive speech, speech in the streets, symbolic 
speech, and so forth). The chapters include brief introductions, but 
primarily consist of a standard selection of edited cases, preceded by 
paragraph-length backgrounds. I find it difficult to evaluate the ed-
iting prior to teaching the cases, but these excerpts are moderate in 
length, seem to focus on the ratio and significance of the case, and 
include a healthy selection of concurring and dissenting opinions. 
The book is sufficiently compact that it would be easy to supple-
ment it with other readings. For one committed to the case 
method, but interested in additional readings, Morgan's text would 
be a good choice. 
But what about the method itself? Relying on impressionistic 
evidence, I suspect it is the most commonly used approach in un-
dergraduate constitutional law courses. I rarely hear my colleagues 
debate its desirability, but frequently hear questions about which 
casebook works best and why. Is there good reason for preference 
or is it simply inertia? 
I think there are at least three good reasons. To begin, it nur-
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tures those skills-careful reading of a text, analysis of the compo-
nents of an idea, persuasion by reasoned argumentation-that are 
the core of a college education. A ten-page reading assignment cov-
ering two cases does not seem like much until one begins to dissect 
the text, distinguishing the dicta, identifying the tests, and following 
the chain of reasoning. Although these tasks can take so much ef-
fort that little time remains for Socratic questioning, a semester of 
that, with occasional unedited cases thrown in, invariably sharpens 
students' ability to read and think critically. I believe those skills 
are at least as valuable as the mastery of doctrine. 
The case approach also reveals much about the idea and 
growth of law. One can theorize about the rule of law or norma-
tively debate the meaning of the Constitution, but only by con-
fronting a series of cases and experiencing the drawing of lines, step 
by step, does one get a feel for law's uncertainty and intricacy. And 
if students read enough concurring and dissenting opinions, they 
also learn that in addition to the dispute between the two litigating 
parties there also is the dispute among nine Justices. The student 
quickly learns that no phrase in the Constitution has a single cor-
rect meaning and that judges themselves are constantly tom be-
tween the intellectual desire to preserve the rule of law and the 
emotional pull to guarantee as much justice as possible in particular 
cases. A good selection of cases has the effect of a Seraut painting: 
all of those discrete cases, woven together, reveal a full picture that 
not only makes sense but also has a certain aesthetic beauty. 
Finally, the case method makes law both real and fascinating. 
Those of us in the academy may thrive on intellectual debates about 
the meaning of constitutional phrases, and we may constantly 
search for more innovative and creative ways of rationalizing our 
reading of the Constitution, but we should never forget that law as 
practiced in the real world of concrete disputes affects human lives. 
For the person facing imminent execution, it does matter whether 
Justices regard the eighth amendment as a concept or a conceptuali-
zation. That sense of immediacy is essential to a full understanding 
of law, and quite frankly, it is one reason that constitutional law 
fascinates both teachers and students. 
There is a danger, however, that the student will become fasci-
nated by the individual stories without having a sense of any unify-
ing theory. Memorizing the facts and importance of cases can 
become so overwhelming that students lose sight of the historical 
and theoretical underpinnings of the Constitution. Students are 
more likely to retain a theoretical approach to law than to remem-
ber fifty or a hundred cases memorized primarily to pass a test. 
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Furthermore, learning to synthesize in broad theoretical terms 
surely is as valuable as learning how to dissect individual cases. 
Bright, articulate students frequently have strong feelings about the 
emotional issues that live controversies frequently raise. But with-
out a grounding in theory they can rarely proffer reasons beyond "it 
doesn't seem fair" or "it's in the Constitution." 
II 
Thomas L. Tedford's Freedom of Speech in the United States is 
a comprehensive text that systematically presents both a theoretical 
overview and a historical perspective. The book's four parts ex-
amine ( 1) the historical role of speech in the Western tradition, 
(2) controls on speech in such areas as sedition, privacy, and ob-
scenity, (3) the special issues of time and place, prior restraint and 
free press, and technology's impact on free speech, and ( 4) the theo-
ries of Chafee, Meiklejohn, Emerson, and Haiman. Recognizing 
the central role of Supreme Court pronouncements, Tedford singles 
out key cases and identifies how the Justices voted, what the opin-
ion declared, and why the case is significant or what rule it estab-
lished. Treatment of the ensuing cases, with brief summaries and 
examples of the Court's line drawing, usually follows. In sum, 
Tedford sets the stage nicely, discusses in detail the development of 
speech law, and considers the impact and results of many lines of 
cases. 
Tedford's approach has two advantages. First, the student can 
learn more, quantitatively, about the subject matter than from the 
case approach, because so much extraneous material is eliminated. 
Second, the method can shed considerable insight into the legal pro-
cess. Tedford, for example, shows how landmark cases simultane-
ously wrap up unsettled issues and open new lines of inquiry. He 
emphasizes the progeny of his key cases and explicitly identifies 
which lines need to be drawn and how subsequent cases do that. 
A comprehensive view of law-or of one aspect of law-re-
quires a theory to hold it together. Although I already have sug-
gested advantages to a theoretical approach, there also are pitfalls. 
In seeing primarily the final product, the student may not appreci-
ate the contradictions and messiness that characterize law. Unless 
one believes that there is an objective telos to law in America, the 
comprehensive theory can be misleading. It shows the tip of the 
iceberg-either as it now looks or as the author envisions it look-
ing-seemingly unaware that the tip might look different from an-
other perspective or that real law is constantly churning below the 
surface. Tedford, for example, may be right to slight the balancing 
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of interests in some speech cases, but there also may be times in the 
future, as there have been in the past, when the complexity of social 
and political conditions elicits that test as a real alternative. Just 
because we have been free of it for a couple of decades does not 
mean speech law has evolved beyond it. 
The other weakness in the textbook survey method stems from 
the difference between constitutional law as a body of material to be 
mastered and constitutional law as a way of thinking or more to the 
point, the difference between learning constitutional doctrine and 
doing constitutional law. When I ask my students to write an opin-
ion on a case currently in front of the Court, I am often amazed at 
the frustrations I engender. They look in every corner of the li-
brary, seek out the reference librarian, and come to my office plead-
ing for help. When they finally conclude that their research alone 
cannot provide any answer, because the Supreme Court has not yet 
spoken to that issue, they begin to think and analogize and create. 
Even if that single case is the only thing they remember from a 
semester of constitutional law, the lessons it teaches about law may 
be worth as much as the large quantity of learning they might ac-
quire from a textbook packed with legal facts and ideas. 
III 
Whereas Morgan and Tedford interpret and give meaning to 
legal products, Alice Fleetwood Bartee, in Cases Lost, Causes Won, 
focuses on the judicial process within which the law develops. Us-
ing systems theory, she presents four case studies (Frohwerk v. 
United States, Minersville v. Gobitis, Walker v. Birmingham, Bob 
White v. Texas) to explain the input, conversion, output, impact, 
and feedback that characterizes the judicial process. She assumes 
that one cannot truly understand the formal law without under-
standing the proceedings that lead up to a decision, the interaction 
of Justices prior to the writing and delivering of an opinion, and the 
impact on both individual litigants and the political-social 
environment. 
One does not have to buy into the totality of legal realism to 
recognize that law is made by nine human beings who do have iden-
tifiable backgrounds, well-developed attitudes, and legal-policy pref-
erences, or that law is inextricably tied to politics. Teachers of the 
Constitution may properly speak about the rule of law with 
profound feeling or treat the Constitution from the perspective of 
normative political theory. Nevertheless, it would do a disservice to 
students to present constitutional law without teaching that at one 
level it is a political activity that requires accommodation among 
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nine Justices and that involves the interaction of many external ac-
tors. To be perfectly frank, most students sense that already. That 
realistic attitude about law and politics is not an endearing trait, 
and one that needs some tempering, but it would be silly to try to 
make law something it is not for an audience that refuses to be 
fooled. 
The reasons for including the judicial process as it really oper-
ates has little to do with pleasing a youthful audience, however, and 
everything to do with obtaining better insights about the law. At 
the most elementary level, that involves learning the fundamental 
facts about the formulating of law. It does no good to talk at length 
about the opinions handed down by the Court if the student does 
not understand how those 150 cases were picked from the more 
than 4000 who appealed to the Court. That might call forth behav-
ioral studies about granting certiorari, but even prior to that it re-
quires discussion of the formal mechanisms for getting to the 
Supreme Court. I learned my lesson about not assuming too much 
the day a very good student, who had mastered the cases with some 
skill, asked me-in the thirteenth week of class-what that Latin 
word the Court had granted meant. 
I know there are many who believe that the focus on process 
and judicial behavior denigrates the idea of law. Identification and 
blocs means nothing unless one has some sense of why those blocks 
formed. It makes considerable difference if they grow out of a 
planned strategy, reflect common backgrounds and attitudes, or re-
sult from five Justices who separately work through cases carefully 
and with integrity and then reach the same conclusions. Two of 
Bartee's cases seem too atypical to be instructive. To use the Bob 
White case-in which the defendant finally wins a new trial only to 
be murdered in the courtroom-as an example of winning in court 
without having the intended impact, seems almost silly when there 
are so many fruitful illustrations of the relationship between what 
the Court says and what eventually happens. 
What is most striking about the judicial process studies is that, 
when done well, they affirm the high quality of constitutional inter-
pretation throughout American history. Martin v. Struthers, which 
involved a dispute between the town of Struthers's anti-doorbell or-
dinance and the Jehovah's Witnesses' desire to preach their faith, 
illustrates the point well. Recall that after hearing the case and dis-
cussing it in conference, the Court came down five-to-four in favor 
of Struthers, with Justice Black writing the opinion. When Mur-
phy's dissent persuaded Black that he had decided wrongly, Black 
changed his vote, making a new five-to-four majority in favor of the 
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Jehovah's Witnesses. Because Black again wrote the majority opin-
ion, the case works nicely when one wants to destroy the myth of 
mechanical jurisprudence. And yet, does it really teach that a 
clever Supreme Court Justice can defend just about any position 
that strikes his fancy? To the contrary, it teaches that Justice Black 
did not decide simply on the basis of personal preferences or charac-
teristics, but did approach the case with a mind ready to be per-
suaded by sound, reasoned argumentation. The same is true in 
Bartee's discussion of the flag salute cases: the flipflop is not proof 
that law is variable and blows with the wind; it is evidence that law 
involves the careful deliberation of judges deeply committed to the 
task of interpreting the Constitution in hard cases. 
IV 
There certainly are other methods one might use in teaching 
constitutional law. For example, the revived body of constitutional 
commentary-primarily out of the law schools but occasionally 
from those trained in political science--could be integral to a class 
in constitutional law. One would not have to rely solely on such 
contemporary thinkers as Perry and Ely. The tradition is a long 
one, and consideration of Story, Cooley, and Tiedeman would serve 
the additional purpose of reminding that neither the approach nor 
many of the conclusions are all that new. Nor is there reason to 
limit oneself to a single method. One might assign a case book, 
lecture from a theoretical perspective, and ask for an essay on a 
judicial biography as one writing assignment. 
Teaching is much too personal for me to prescribe a method 
for others; for the same reason I have been reluctant to evaluate 
closely the classroom worth of these three texts. I feel particularly 
strongly about this since I revise my own syllabus and change texts 
on a regular basis. Nevertheless, there are definite strengths and 
weaknesses with each approach, and I hope that by recalling some 
of them I have contributed to the ongoing discussion of how one 
might best teach constitutional law to undergraduates. 
